Statement by the judges of the Supreme Court
Warsaw, 24 February 2026
In view of the convening of the General Assembly of Judges of the Supreme Court on 24 February 2026 for the purpose of selecting candidates for the position of First President of the Supreme Court,
we, the undersigned judges of the Supreme Court, declare that we will not participate in this General Assembly for the following reasons:
– The General Assembly of Supreme Court Judges was convened by a person appointed to the office of First President of the Supreme Court in violation of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the 2017 Act on the Supreme Court;
– the intention to hold the Meeting with the participation of judges who took up positions in the Supreme Court after flawed proceedings means that it will not constitute a General Assembly of Supreme Court Judges, a body of the Supreme Court and a self-governing body within the meaning of Article 16 § 2 of the Supreme Court Act of 2017.
Justification
We would like to remind you that:
(1) The General Assembly of Supreme Court Judges – convened pursuant to Article 12 § 2 of the Act of 8 December 2017 on the Supreme Court (consolidated text: Journal of Laws of 2019, item 825, as amended; hereinafter referred to as the 2017 Supreme Court Act) and conducted in accordance with Order No. 51/2020 P.O. of the First President of the Supreme Court of 2 May 2020 on the organisation of the General Assembly of the Supreme Court – deliberated on 8-9, 13-14 and 21-23 May 2020. The chair of the meeting did not allow the election process to be completed by putting to the vote a resolution of the Assembly to present five candidates for the position of First President of the Supreme Court to the President of the Republic of Poland, despite being informed of the need to adopt such a resolution in a motion submitted by the members of the Assembly on 22 May 2020.
The chair of the Assembly presented the President of the Republic of Poland with a list of candidates for the position of First President of the Supreme Court arbitrarily, without obtaining a resolution of the General Assembly of Supreme Court Judges, which would finalise the election proceedings.
The President of the Republic of Poland – despite being informed by the members of the Assembly (in letters dated 12 May and 22 May 2020) that the Assembly was conducting its proceedings in violation of the law and that it had not adopted the resolution required by Article 183(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland on presenting candidates for the position of First President of the Supreme Court – on 25 May 2020, he appointed Judge Małgorzata Manowska to this position;
(2) The General Assembly of Supreme Court Judges convened on 12 June 2020 at the request of Supreme Court judges (Article 17 § 1(3) of the Act on the Supreme Court of 2017, § 25(2) of the Regulation of the President of the Republic of Poland of 29 March 2018 – Rules of Procedure of the Supreme Court, Journal of Laws of 2018, item 660; hereinafter referred to as the Rules of Procedure of the Supreme Court of 2018) in order to discuss the manner of filling the office of First President of the Supreme Court did not take place due to the failure of all (except for the acting presidents at that time) appointed to these positions in proceedings conducted with the participation of the National Council of the Judiciary established by the Act of 8 December 2017 amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary and certain other acts (Journal of Laws of 2018, item 3; hereinafter referred to as the 2017 amending act).
No new date was set for the Assembly, which was interrupted due to the lack of a quorum, despite the obligation incumbent on the First President of the Supreme Court (Article 17 § 1(3) of the Act on the Supreme Court of 2017, § 25(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Supreme Court of 2018 and § 26(2) of the Regulation of the President of the Republic of Poland of 14 July 2022 – Rules of Procedure of the Supreme Court, Journal of Laws of 2024, item 806; hereinafter referred to as the Rules of Procedure of the Supreme Court of 2022).
General meetings of Supreme Court judges, which should be held at least once a year (Section 25(1) of the 2018 Rules of Procedure of the Supreme Court and Section 26(2) of the 2022 Rules of Procedure of the Supreme Court), were not convened by the acting First President of the Supreme Court until 24 October 2024, when the number of judges appointed to positions in proceedings conducted with the participation of the National Council of the Judiciary, as established by the 2017 amending act, exceeded the number of persons who had been appointed in a non-flawed procedure, which created conditions for voting on each resolution in accordance with the motions of persons who took office after 2018.
(3) The Disciplinary Chamber and the Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs Chamber, established in the Supreme Court on the basis of the 2017 Supreme Court Act, with the aim of introducing into that Court the largest possible group of persons appointed in proceedings conducted with the participation of the National Council of the Judiciary as shaped by the 2017 amending act , which was to accelerate the domination of this group of judges appointed to the Court in a non-flawed procedure. The European Court of Human Rights has already ruled in several judgments that the Disciplinary Chamber did not constitute a ‘court’ within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (OJ 1993, No 61, p. 284, hereinafter referred to as the Convention), which corresponds to Article 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2016/C 202/02, hereinafter referred to as the Charter) (see CJEU judgment of 15 July 2021, C-791/19, CJEU judgments of 4 September 2025, C-225/22, on the status of the Disciplinary Chamber – see, inter alia, the ECtHR judgment of 22 July 2021, in the case of Reczkowicz v. Poland, application No. 43447/19, ECHR judgment of 6 July 2023 in the case of Tuleja v. Poland, complaints nos. 21181/19 and 51751/20, in particular paragraph 343 of the judgment). Similarly, the ECtHR assessed the Extraordinary and Public Affairs Chamber, composed exclusively of judges appointed in a flawed nomination procedure, issuing a pilot judgment in this case on 23 November 2023, Wałęsa v. Poland, application no. 50849/21).
After the Disciplinary Chamber was abolished, some of its judges were transferred to other chambers of the Supreme Court, even though they had not taken part in competitions to verify their qualifications to adjudicate in those chambers. Judges participating in competitions announced to fill positions in the Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs Chamber were also transferred to other chambers of the Supreme Court, while the number of judges in that Chamber was increased in subsequent competitions.
(4) After eight years of applying the 2017 Act on the Supreme Court and the 2017 Act on the National Council of the Judiciary, most of the persons adjudicating in the Supreme Court, including all presidents managing the work of the chambers and most of the chairpersons of the divisions within the chambers, were appointed to the office of Supreme Court judge with the participation of the National Council of the Judiciary as shaped by the 2017 amending act, in proceedings whose structure and conduct grossly violated the provisions of the Polish Constitution. As a result, these judges are not capable of forming a “court” within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention, regardless of which chamber of the Supreme Court they adjudicate in (see, for example, the judgments of the ECtHR of 3 February 2022, Advance Pharma Sp. z o.o. v. Poland, application no. 1469/20 – concerning the adjudicating panel in the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court; cf. also paragraphs 324-220 of the pilot judgment in the case of Wałęsa v. Poland; as well as, mutatis mutandis, the judgments of the CJEU of 4 September 2025, C-225/22, of 21 December 2023, C-718/21, LG, resolution of the joint Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social Insurance Chambers of 23 January 2020, BSA I-4110-1/20, resolution of the seven-judge panel of the Supreme Court of 24 September 2025, III PZP 1/25, Supreme Court decision of 21 May 2019, III CZP 25/19, Supreme Administrative Court judgments of 6 May 2021, II GOK 2/18 and of 21 September 2021, II GOK 10/21). The status of these persons raises constitutional doubts.
Judgment of the CJEU of 1 August 2025 in joined cases C-422/23, C-455/23, C-459/23, C-486/23 and C-493/23 Daka et al. (ECLI:EU:C: 2025:592) does not legitimise the status of a person holding the position of First President of the Supreme Court who was appointed to the office of Supreme Court judge in flagrant violation of the national procedure for the selection of judges and in circumstances constituting a violation of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. These conditions have been described in detail in CJEU judgments (most recently in the CJEU judgment of 21 December 2023, C-718/21, Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa, ECLI:EU:C:2023:1015, and of 4 September 2025, C-225/22, R SA v AW T sp z o.o., ECLI:EU:C:2025:649) and numerous judgments of the Supreme Court (e.g. the resolution of the seven-judge panel of the Supreme Court of 24 September 2025, III PZP 1/25). A court operating with the participation of such persons is not an independent court established by law. Consequently, from the point of view of EU law, proceedings before panels of the Supreme Court involving such persons do not guarantee the right to effective legal protection (e.g. CJEU judgment of 21 December 2023, C-718/21, National Council of the Judiciary, ECLI:EU:C:2023:1015). Rulings made by such panels may be considered null and void under the rules set out in the CJEU judgment of 4 September 2025, C-225/22, ‘R’ SA v AW ‘T’ sp z o.o. (ECLI:EU:C:2025:649).
Judgment C-422/23 Daka and Others rules that a panel of the Supreme Court established by orders of a person holding a functional position in the Supreme Court who was appointed as a judge of that Court in circumstances that infringed Article 19(1)(2) TEU, will be a court that meets the requirements of EU law if it is composed exclusively of judges appointed in a procedure that does not violate EU and Council of Europe standards.
In its judgment of 18 December 2025 in Case C-448/23 European Commission v Republic of Poland (ECLI:EU:C: 2025:975), it was ruled that, from the point of view of EU law, a breach of national law in the selection of the president of a court such as the Constitutional Tribunal leads to a breach of the independence and impartiality of the court he or she heads (paragraph 291). The President of the Constitutional Tribunal plays an important role in its functioning (paragraphs 278-279). Consequently, the flawed selection of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal leads to a violation of Article 19(1)(2) TEU by allowing a person who does not guarantee independence and impartiality from political authority to head a judicial body of a Member State (paragraph 291).
From the point of view of EU law, significant flaws in the procedure for selecting the President of the court of last instance in a Member State may consist of: 1) irregularities in the election process itself (e.g. the lack of a resolution of the General Assembly of judges of the court concerned, as required by national law, see, for example, paragraph 290); 2) the participation in the selection process of candidates for the position of president of the court of persons who were improperly appointed to the position of judge (paragraph 288). The fact that judges whose election was affected by a flagrant breach of national law and the requirements of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU participate in the General Assembly renders that Assembly and the votes cast by them defective (paragraph 288).
This judgment provides a legal basis for refusing to participate in the General Assembly of the Supreme Court aimed at selecting candidates for the First President of the Supreme Court.
Due to the invalidity of the appointment to judicial positions in the Supreme Court of persons selected in competitions decided by the National Council of the Judiciary formed on the basis of the provisions of the Act of 8 December 2017 amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary and certain other acts (Journal of Laws of 2018, item 3) , the First President of the Supreme Court selected from among candidates presented by the General Assembly of the Supreme Court acting with the participation of such persons may raise reasonable doubts in the minds of individuals as to whether such a person would use the prerogatives and office of the First President of the Supreme Court as an instrument to influence the judicial activity of that court or to exercise political control over that activity, and, as a result, as to the independence and impartiality of that court.
For these reasons, we declare that we will not participate in the deliberations convened for 24 February 2026, the purpose of which is to select candidates for the office of First President of the Supreme Court.
Once again, we appeal to all Polish authorities to restore the judiciary, including the Supreme Court, which is an important part of the state for its citizens. Until this restoration takes place, we will not participate in the General Assembly of Supreme Court judges or in the assemblies of individual Chambers of the Supreme Court.
Michał Laskowski
Jarosław Matras
Dariusz Dończyk
Jacek Błaszczyk
Tomasz Artymiuk
Barbara Skoczkowska
Marek Pietruszyński
Karol Weitz
Andrzej Stępka
Dariusz Zawistowski
Monika Koba
Jerzy Grubba
Kazimierz Klugiewicz
Dariusz Świecki
Waldemar Płóciennik
Grzegorz Misiurek
Piotr Prusinowski
Bohdan Bieniek
Dawid Miąsik
Paweł Wiliński
Małgorzata Wąsek-Wiaderek
Eugeniusz Wilidowicz
Włodzimierz Wróbel
Marta Romańska,
Agnieszka Piotrowska
Roman Trzaskowski
Władysław Pawlak
Zbigniew Puszkarski
Paweł Grzegorczyk
The title has been provided by the Editorial Board
Grafika:„Warszawa 9471.jpg” — autor: Darwinek, źródło: Wikimedia Commons, licencja: CC BY-SA 3.0.
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